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Abstract
Uncertainty theory provides us an alternative for modeling human uncertainty without
the scope of probability theory. In a dynamic game, the system dynamics often has
noise by human disturbance and can be described by an uncertain differential
equation. In order to investigate such a problem, an uncertain differential game model
and its solution concept of feedback Nash equilibrium is proposed in this paper.
Moreover, a sufficient condition is established to guarantee a feedback Nash
equilibrium of the game. As an application, the capitalism problem is analyzed by
uncertain differential game. The results show that uncertain differential game is a
powerful tool for dealing with dynamic game.
Keywords: Uncertain variable; Differential game; Feedback Nash equilibrium;
Capitalism
Introduction
As a collection of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between rational deci-
sion makers, game theory [1] has been proven useful in many fields such as economics,
management science, and sociology. According to the moves of players made simultane-
ously or over a number of time periods, games fall into two categories: static game and
dynamic game. Extensive game [1,2], which gives an explicit description of the sequen-
tial structure of game actions, is essentially a discrete dynamic game. When the system
state is continuous over time and the system dynamics can be described by a differential
equation, dynamic game has evolved into the differential game.
The origin of differential game could be traced to the pioneering work of Rufus Isaacs,
who modeled missile versus enemy aircraft pursuit schemes in terms of state and con-
trol variables. His famous bookDifferential Games [3] marked the birth of the differential
game. Soon afterwards, much further work springed up in the field of differential game.
In 1964, Berkovitz [4] proposed a variational approach to differential game. In 1966,
Pontryagin [5] solved the differential game in open-loop solution in terms of the max-
imum principle. In 1967, Leitmann and Mon [6] investigated some geometric aspects
of differential game. In 1971, Friedman [7] introduced discrete approximation sequence
methods to establish the values of differential game and existence of saddle point. His
work laid a solid mathematical foundation for differential game theory.
As an effective means to represent conflict situation, differential game theory is
widely applied, particularly in the area of military confrontations. However, in real-word
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applications, the state evolution is often affected by the interference of noise. The noise
may be added to the players’ observations of the system state or to the state equation
itself. In order to model the noise, there exist two mathematical systems. One is proba-
bility theory (Kolmogorov [8]), and the other is uncertainty theory (Liu [9]). Probability
is interpreted as a frequency that requires enough historical data for probabilistic reason-
ing, while uncertainty is interpreted as personal belief degree that is from domain experts
for lack of samples.
When noise is modeled by the Wiener process and system evolution can be described
by a stochastic differential equation, the differential game will evolve into stochastic dif-
ferential game. Thanks to Fleming [10] for his important work in stochastic control, a
spectrum of stochastic differential game was proposed for analyzing differential game in
stochastic situations. Since then, stochastic differential game has been discussed by many
researchers. For instance, Basar [11] considered quadratic stochastic differential game.
Clemhout and Wan [12] proposed dynamic common property resources and environ-
ment problems. Kaitala [13] gave equilibrium solution in stochastic resourcemanagement
game under imperfect information. Jørgensen and Yeung [14] investigated a common
property fishery problem in stochastic differential game model.
Sometimes, no samples are available to estimate the probability distribution. For such
situation, we have no choice but to invite some domain experts to evaluate the belief
degree that each event will occur. Perhaps some people would like to regard the belief
degree as subjective probability or fuzzy concept, but it is usually inappropriate because
both probability theory and fuzzy set theory may lead to counter-intuitive results in this
case (see [15]). In order to rationally deal with belief degrees, uncertainty theory was
founded in 2007 by Liu [9] and subsequently studied by many researchers. Nowadays,
uncertainty theory has become a branch of axiomatic mathematics for modeling human
uncertainty.
In 2008, Liu [16] proposed the concept of uncertain process for describing dynamic
uncertain systems. Moreover, Liu [17] designed a Lipschitz continuous uncertain pro-
cess with stationary and independent normal uncertain increments, which is called the
canonical Liu process now. Chen and Ralescu [18] defined and discussed the Liu process
and uncertain calculus. When the noise of system state evolution can be described by
the Liu process, Liu [16] introduced uncertain differential equation. Chen and Liu [19]
gave an existence and uniqueness theorem for an uncertain differential equation under
linear growth and Lipschitz continuous condition. Yao and Chen [20] proposed a numer-
ical method to solve uncertain differential equation. Besides, Yao [21] studied the integral
of solution to uncertain differential equation. As an application of uncertain differential
equation, Liu [22] presented a paradox of stochastic finance theory which showed that
the real stock price was impossible to follow any Ito’s stochastic differential equation, and
suggested a new uncertain finance theory which was described by an uncertain differen-
tial equation. Based on uncertainty theory and uncertain differential equation, Zhu [23]
introduced uncertain optimal control and gave Zhu’s equation of optimality by means of
uncertain differential equation. Due to his pioneering work, this paper aims to initialize a
spectrum of uncertain differential game when the system dynamics of game is described
by an uncertain differential equation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Firstly, we briefly review some
basic results of uncertainty theory in the section ‘Preliminaries.’ Secondly, we use an
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uncertain differential equation to describe the system dynamics of differential game in
the section ‘Uncertain differential games’ and present an uncertain differential game
model. Moreover, we define feedback Nash equilibrium strategies as the solution of the
uncertain differential game and construct a sufficient condition for a feedback Nash equi-
librium. Thirdly, we apply the uncertain differential game to capitalism in the section
‘An uncertain differential game of capitalism.’ In the capitalism, the government will tax
less than the full amount of the payoff accrued to the firm, which will post a positive rate
of investment. By comparison, we show that the uncertain differential game is an efficient
means to solve the problem of capitalism.
Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce some basic results in uncertainty theory.
Definition 1. (Liu [9]) Let L be a σ -algebra on a nonempty set . A set functionM :
L→[0, 1] is called an uncertain measure if it satisfies the following axioms:
Axiom 1. (Normality Axiom)M{} = 1 for the universal set .
Axiom 2. (Duality Axiom)M{} +M{c} = 1 for any event .











Besides, in order to provide the operational law, Liu [17] defined the product uncertain
measure on the product σ -algebra L as follows.
Axiom 4. (Product Axiom) Let (k ,Lk ,Mk) be uncertainty spaces for k = 1, 2, . . . .










where k are arbitrarily chosen events from Lk for k = 1, 2, . . .,
respectively.
Definition 2. (Liu [9]) An uncertain variable is a function from an uncertainty space
(,L,M) to the set of real numbers such that for any Borel set B of real numbers, the set
{ξ ∈ B} = {γ ∈ |ξ(γ ) ∈ B}
is an event.
In order to describe uncertain variable in practice, uncertainty distribution  :  →
[0, 1] of an uncertain variable ξ is defined as
(x) =M {ξ ≤ x} .
An uncertainty distribution (·) is said to be regular if its inverse function −1(α)
exists and is unique for each α ∈ (0, 1), and −1(·) is called the inverse uncertainty
distribution of ξ .
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for any Borel sets B1,B2, . . . ,Bm of real numbers.









provided that at least one of the two integrals is finite.
If ξ is a regular uncertain variable with uncertainty distribution(x), then the expected











Based on the uncertainty space, Liu introduced the concepts of uncertain process,
canonical Liu process, uncertain differential equation, etc.
Definition 5. (Liu [16]) Let T be an index set and let (,L,M) be an uncertainty space.
An uncertain process is a measurable function from T × (,L,M) to the set of real
numbers, i.e., for each t ∈ T and any Borel set B,
{Xt ∈ B} = {γ ∈ |Xt(γ ) ∈ B}
is an event.
Definition 6. (Liu [16]) An uncertain processXt is said to have independent increments
if
Xt0 , Xt1 − Xt0 , Xt2 − Xt1 , . . . , Xtk − Xtk−1
are independent uncertain variables where t0 is the initial time and t1, t2, . . ., tk are any
times with t0 < t1 < . . . < tk .
Definition 7. (Liu [16]) An uncertain process Xt is said to have stationary increments
if, for any given t > 0, the increments Xs+t − Xs are identically distributed uncertain
variables for all s > 0.
Definition 8. (Liu [17]) An uncertain process Ct is said to be a canonical Liu process if
(i) C0 = 0 and almost all sample paths are Lipschitz continuous.
(ii) Ct has stationary and independent increments.
(iii) Every increment Cs+t − Cs is a normal uncertain variable with expected value 0







, x ∈ .
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Definition 9. (Chen and Ralescu [18]) Let Ct be a canonical Liu process and let Zt be
an uncertain process. If there exist two uncertain processes μt and σt such that







for any t ≥ 0, then Zt is called a Liu process with drift μt and diffusion σt . Furthermore,
Zt has an uncertain differential
dZt = μtdt + σtdCt .
Theorem 1. (Liu [17]) (Fundamental Theorem of Uncertain Calculus) Let h(t, c) be a






Based on the Liu process, the following concept of uncertain differential equation was
introduced by Liu [16].
Definition 10. (Liu [16]) Suppose Ct is a canonical Liu process, and f and g are some
given functions. Then,
dXt = f (t,Xt)dt + g(t,Xt)dCt (1)
is called an uncertain differential equation. A solution is a Liu process Xt that satisfies (1)
identically in t.
Chen and Liu [19] presented an existence and uniqueness theorem for an uncertain
differential equation.
Definition 11. (Chen and Liu [19]) The uncertain differential equation
Xt = f (t,Xt)dt + g(t,Xt)dCt
has a unique solution if the coefficients f (t, x) and g(t, x) satisfy the linear growth
condition
| f (t, x)| + |g(t, x)| ≤ L(1 + |x|), ∀x ∈ , t ≥ 0
and Lipschitz condition
| f (t, x) − f (t, y)| + |g(t, x) − g(t, y)| ≤ L|x − y|, ∀x, y ∈ , t ≥ 0
for some constant L. Moreover, the solution is sample continuous.
By means of uncertain differential equation, Zhu [23] introduced uncertain optimal
control and gave an equation of optimality.
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Definition 12. (Zhu [23]) Assume that R is the return function and W is the function
of terminal reward. If we want to maximize the expected return on [0,T] using an optimal
control, then we have the following optimal control model:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩





R(t, x(t),u(t))dt + W (T , x(T))
]
subject to
dx(t) = f (t, x(t),u(t))dt + g(t, x(t),u(t))dCt
x(t) = x0.
In order to find the optimal control, we write





R(s, x(s),u(s))ds + W (T , x(T))
]
where t ∈[0,T] and x(t) = x.
Theorem 2. (Zhu [23]) (Zhu’s Equation of Optimality) Let J(t, x) be twice differentiable
on [0,T]×R, then we have
−Jt(t, x) = sup
u
{
R(t, x,u) + Jx(t, x)f (t, x,u)
}
,
where Jt(t, x) and Jx(t, x) are the partial derivatives of J(t, x) with respect to t and x,
respectively. Note that the boundary condition is
J(T , x) = W (T , x).
Uncertain differential games
Differential game is a class of decision problem under which the evolution of the state is
described by a differential equation, the players act throughout a time interval [t0,T] and
want to maximize the payoff.





Ri(t, x(t),u1(t),u2(t), . . . ,un(t))dt + Wi(x(T)) for i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n} (2)
subject to the deterministic dynamics (vector-valued differential equation)
dx(t) = f (t, x(t),u1(t),u2(t), . . . ,un(t))dt, x(t0) = x0, (3)
where T > t0 ≥ 0, x(t) ∈ m denotes the state variable of the game, ui ∈ Ui (Ui is a
compact metric space) is the control variable of player i, and the initial state x0 is given.
The function Ri(t, x,u1,u2, . . . ,un) is a transient payoff function of player i at time t,
Wi(·) is a terminal reward function of player i at terminal time T, and f (t, x,u1,u2, . . . ,un)
is a vector function. All functions mentioned are differentiable.
In a real game, the state evolution is often affected by the interference of noise that is
added to the players’ observations of the state of the system or to the state equation itself.
One way to incorporate noise in differential game is to introduce uncertain dynamics. An
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uncertain formulation for quantitative differential game of prescribed duration involves a
vector-valued uncertain differential equation driven by the Liu process:
dx(t) = f (t, x(t),u1(t),u2(t), . . . ,un(t))dt
+ σ(t, x(t),u1(t),u2(t), . . . ,un(t))dCt , x(t0) = x0
(4)






Ri(t, x(t),u1(t),u2(t), . . . ,un(t))dt + Wi(x(T))
]
for i ∈ N , (5)
where Et0 denotes the expectation operator performed at time t0 and the canonical Liu
process Ct defined on an uncertainty space (,L,M) is -dimension.
Now, let us make the following assumptions about the functions f (·) and σ(·). Suppose
f :[t0,T]×m × U1 × · · · × Un −→ m
and
σ :[t0,T]×m × U1 × · · · × Un −→ m × 
have continuous partial derivatives and satisfy the linear growth condition and Lipschitz
condition.
Each player has perfect observations of the state vector x(t) at every moment t ∈ [t0,T]
and constructs his strategy in the game (4)-(5) as an admissible feedback control of the
following type:
ui(t) = ui(t, x(t))
where
ui(·, ·) :[t0,T]×m −→ Ui.
Denote
u−i(t, x) = {u1(t, x),u2(t, x), . . . ,ui−1(t, x),ui+1(t, x), . . . ,un(t, x)}.
A feedback Nash equilibrium of the uncertain differential game (4)-(5) can be defined
as follows.
Definition 13. A set of strategies {u∗1(s, x),u∗2(s, x), . . . ,u∗n(s, x)} is called a feedback
Nash equilibrium for the n-person uncertain differential game (4)-(5), and {x∗(s), t ≤
s ≤ T} is the corresponding state trajectory, if there exist real-valued functions Vi(t, x) :
[t0,T]×m → , satisfying the following relations for each i ∈ N :
Vi(t, x) = Et0
[∫ T
t





Ri(s, x[i](s),ui(s, x[i]),u∗−i(s, x[i]))ds + Wi(x[i](T))
]
,
∀ui(·, ·) ∈[t0,T]×m, x(·) ∈ m;
Vi(T , x) = Wi(x(T))
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where on the time interval [t,T]:
dx∗(s) = f (t, x∗(s),u∗i (s, x∗),u∗−i(s, x∗))ds + σ(t, x∗(s),u∗i (s, x∗),u∗−i(s, x∗))dCs,
x∗(t) = x;
dx[i](s)= f (s,x[i](s),ui(s, x[i]),u∗−i(s, x[i]))ds + σ(s,x[i](s),ui(s, x[i]),u∗−i(s, x[i]))dCs,
x[i](t) = x.
The feature of the definition of feedback Nash equilibrium is that if an n-pair
{u∗i (s, x); i ∈ N} provides a feedback Nash equilibrium to n-person uncertain differen-
tial game (4)-(5) with duration [ t0,T], its restriction to the time interval [t,T] provides
a feedback Nash equilibrium to the same differential game (4)-(5) defined on the shorter
time interval [t,T], with the initial state taken as x(t), and this being so for all t ∈[t0,T].
Feedback Nash equilibrium depends only on the time variable t and the current value of
the state x(t), but not on memory (including the initial state x0).
Next, we give sufficient conditions guaranteeing the {u∗i (t, x); i ∈ N} is a feedback Nash
equilibrium for the game (4)-(5).
Theorem 3. An n-tuple of strategies {u∗i (t, x); i ∈ N} provides a feedback Nash equilib-
rium to the n-person uncertain differential game (4)-(5) if there exist real-valued functions
V i(t, x) :[t0,T]×m → , i ∈ N, satisfying the partial differential equations
−Vit (t, x) = supui
{
Ri(t, x,ui(t, x),u∗−i(t, x)) + Vix(t, x)f (t, x,ui(t, x),u∗−i(t, x))
}
= Ri(t, x,u∗i (t, x),u∗−i(t, x)) + Vix(t, x)f (t, x,u∗i (t, x),u∗−i(t, x)),
Vi(T , x) = Wi(x(T)).
Proof. This result follows readily from the definition of feedback Nash equilibrium and
from Theorem 2, since by fixing all players’ strategies, except the ith one’s, at their equi-
librium choices, we arrive at an uncertain optimal control problem of the type covered by
Theorem 2.
An uncertain differential game of capitalism
Let us return to one of the classical problems: capitalism, considering an uncertain dif-
ferential game of capitalism where the capital accumulation process may be subjected
to uncertainties such as environmental disasters (the global financial crisis). In brief, the
state trajectory is represented by the uncertain differential equation.
Consider an uncertain differential game of capitalism with two players, a govern-
ment and a representative firm. The government represents the workers, while the firm
represents the capitalist.
The economy has a neoclassical production function y = f (k); it satisfies f ′(k) >
0, f ′′(k) < 0, lim
k→0
f ′(k) = ∞, lim
k→∞
f ′(k) = 0. The labor force receives an income equal to
its marginal product f (k) − kf ′(k), while the firm derives a rent equivalent to its marginal
product f ′(k), where k is capital per labor.
The capital accumulation equation is given by
dK = [s( f ′(k)L − X) − δK] dt, (6)
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where t ∈ [0,T], K is the capital, L is the labor, s is the investment rate controlled by
the firm, X denotes the total social transfer within the government’s control, and δ is the
depreciation rate.
Assume that labor dynamics follows an uncertain differential equation
dL = nLdt + σLdC (7)
where n is the expected rate of labor, σ is the instantaneous variance, and C is a one-
dimensional canonical Liu process.
We can treat capital per labor k = K/L  h(K , L) and apply the uncertain calculus
(Theorem 1), we obtain
dk = hKdK + hLdL
= [s( f ′(k) − x) − (δ + n)k] dt − σkdC,
(8)
where x = X/L represents the social transfer per labor with the government’s control.
This is the state trajectory uncertain different equation, and the initial state k(0) is fixed,
equal to k0.
The government in this model is a vote maximizer with vote function
RG(k, x(·), s(·)) = f (k) − kf ′(k) + x.
It is straightforward that −f (k) + kf ′(k) ≤ x ≤ f ′(k). Then, the government’s objective
functional can be written as





e−ρt[ f (k) − kf ′(k) + x] dt
]
, (9)
where ρ is a positive discount rate and E denotes the expectation operator performed at
time 0.
Assume that the firm owns the capital in the production process and controls invest-
ment. The objective of the firm is to maximize the payment for the shareholders
RF(k, x(·), s(·)) = (1 − s)( f ′(k) − x), 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,
where x is the social transfer (the government may be tax or subsidize the firm) and s is
the investment controlled by the firm.
The firm’s objective functional is





e−ρt(1 − s)[ f ′(k) − x] dt
]
. (10)
To summarize, we have defined an uncertain differential game model of capitalism by
(8)-(10).
By Theorem 3, the following partial differential equations are satisfied.
−JGt (t, k) = sup
x(·)
{
e−ρt[ f (k)− kf ′(k) + x]




−JFt (t, k) = sup
s(·)
{
e−ρt(1 − s)[ f ′(k) − x¯]




The control (x¯, s¯) in the uncertain differential game of capitalism is a feedback Nash
equilibrium in the sense that they are functions of current time t and current state k.
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Respective maximization of Equation 11 with respect to x(·) and Equation 12 with
respect to s(·) yield




k (t, k) = e−ρt .
These values can be substituted back into the respective (11) and (12) to obtain
− JGt (t, k) = e−ρt[ f (k) − kf ′(k) + f ′(k) −
k
s¯ (δ + n)] , (13)
− JFt (t, k) = e−ρt[ f ′(k) − x¯ − (δ + n)k] . (14)
For the government, let JG(t, k) = e−ρtAk2. Hence, JGt (t, k) = −ρe−ρtAk2 and
JGk (t, k) = 2Ake−ρt .
Substitute these into (13) and solve for A which is given by
A = f (k) − kf
′(k) + f ′(k) − (k/s¯)(δ + n)
ρk2 .
Thus,
JG(t, k) = e−ρt f (k) − kf
′(k) + f ′(k) − (k/s¯)(δ + n)
ρ
.
Similarly for the firm, we let JF(t, k) = e−ρtBk2. Thus, JFt (t, k) = −ρe−ρtBk2 and
JFk (t, k) = 2Bke−ρt .
We solve B which is given by
B = f
′(k) − x¯ − (δ + n)k
ρk2 .
It follows that
JF(t, k) = e−ρt f
′(k) − x¯ − (δ + n)k
ρ
.
Proposition 1. The feedback Nash equilibrium for capitalism is given by
(s¯, x¯) =
( k(ρ + 2δ + 2n)
2[ f (k) − kf ′(k) + f ′(k)] , f
′(k) −
(ρ





Proof. It is easily obtained by the above equation.
Lemma 1. If the following inequality holds:
−ρ − δ − n ≤ δ + n ≤ 2k [ f (k) − kf
′(k) + f ′(k)]−(ρ + δ + n),
then s¯ is non-negative.
Proof. Because investment rate s¯ satisfies constraint 0 ≤ s¯ ≤ 1, we can easily obtain this
condition.
We say δ + n is the effective depreciation rate of capital per labor, and the upper
and lower bounds of the effective depreciation rate of capital per labor are given from
Lemma 1.
In the deterministic game of capitalism, the payoff of the firm is completely taxed away,
and the firm stops investing completely, which is a very extreme and unrealistic solution.
However, in the uncertain differential game of capitalism, the government will tax less
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than the full amount of the payoff accrued to the firm, which will post a positive rate of
investment.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigated an uncertain differential game based on the uncertain opti-
mal control. The state dynamics is an uncertain differential equation involving a Liu
process. Moreover, we proposed the definition of feedback Nash equilibrium strategies as
the solution of the uncertain differential game, and a sufficient condition provided a way
to find feedback equilibrium was constructed. Finally, we applied the uncertain differen-
tial game to capitalism problem. In the capitalism, the government will tax less than the
full amount of the payoff accrued to the firm, which will post a positive rate of investment.
Meanwhile, this work initiated a spectrum of uncertain differential games. Therefore,
there are lots of things for further research. At least, onemay consider zero-sum uncertain
differential games, linear-quadratic uncertain differential games, and uncertain differen-
tial games with asymmetric information. Furthermore, one may study the application of
uncertain differential games such as common property fishery problem, natural resources
extraction, and military confrontation.
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